Fishing by himself, Al can expect to catch four fish while Bart will catch no fish.
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They cooperate not for the common good, but for their own selfish benefit.īut suppose fisherman Al is a very good fisherman, and fisherman Bart doesn’t have the foggiest idea about how to catch fish. They cooperate because of the expected individual gain-the bonus of one fish each will catch because of their cooperation. The expected group gain is not the number that will guarantee that the two men cooperate. That results in a Gross Group Income of eight fish, a net gain of two fish. Suppose that each man knows that if the two of them cooperate (share knowledge about where the best fishing spots are, watch each other’s lines, help net the fish when one is caught, and so on), they can expect to catch four fish apiece. Each individual is only interested in the three fish he expects to catch. An economist will tell us the expected Gross Group Income is six fish, but neither fisherman will think about that. Both fishermen are reasonably competent and each can expect to catch three fish by fishing alone. Let’s look at a simple situation that tells us something about how and why humans cooperate and how we determine the common good. Too many people will take the benefit without contributing anything to the cooperative effort.īut how does one determine what is the common good and the general welfare? They will tell you that we cannot trust humans to sacrifice voluntarily for the common good, and that any community effort that depends on voluntary contribution is doomed to failure because of the free-rider dilemma. If you have ever argued for freedom and individual liberty, someone has probably argued back that the commanding hand of government must be present to provide for the common good and to promote the general welfare. Tanner, who lives in Moscow, Idaho, is a retired American diplomat and freelance writer.
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